SOUTH AUSTRALIAN
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

A MANAGEMENT PLAN
for
YATALA LABOUR PRISON

March 1983

TOUCHE ROSS SERVICES
ADELAIDE AND KANSAS CITY
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

HJS/LB

4 March 1983

Mr M J Dawes
Executive Director
Department of Correctional Services
4th Floor, Citicorp Building
345 King William Street
ADELAIDE SA 5000

Dear Mr Dawes

Touche Ross Services is pleased to submit the attached Management Plan for Yatala Labour Prison. The Plan contains a wide range of recommendations, the implementation of which will be vital to the long term success of the Prison.

Yatala Labour Prison is currently at a low point in its history. The need for change has been highlighted by a number of reviews including the Cassidy, Touche Ross and Clarkson Royal Commission reports. A great deal of money has been expended on facility and equipment upgrades. Still, little improvement has occurred. It is imperative that a new direction be established and that needed major changes in the operation of the institution occur as quickly as possible. We believe Government and the Department must agree to act now and act decisively to assure the future safety and security of the institution.

Touche Ross Services is pleased to have had the opportunity to be of service to the Department. Should you have any questions regarding the content of this report, or if we can provide additional assistance, please contact Mr Hugh Swink at 816-474-6180 in the United States, or Mr Philip Speakman at 212 1533 in Adelaide.

Yours sincerely

Hugh J. Swink
PARTNER, TOUCHE ROSS & CO
KANSAS CITY, USA.
A MANAGEMENT PLAN
for
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TOUCHE ROSS SERVICES
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# A MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR YATALA LABOUR PRISON

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SECTION 1. MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The development of this plan was initiated by the Government of South Australia and the Department of Correctional Services in direct response to rising concerns regarding the safety, security and operational effectiveness of Yatala Labour Prison. The plan is intended to serve as a guide and framework for proceeding with the much needed upgrading of Yatala Labour Prison into a modern day high security institution. We believe the direction set and the recommendations offered are sound, compatible, implementable solutions which reflect the ideas and standards currently accepted in today's corrections environment. While a number of the individual recommendations are free standing, all of the elements of the plan are interrelated and interdependent. It is therefore important that the plan be considered in its entirety and not as independent sections.

PRIMARY THRUST OF THE PLAN

The plan is built around three underlying principles critical to the revitalization of the institution:

- developing a top and middle management structure which assigns responsibility, authority and accountability

- developing a unit concept for staff deployment which will assure individual officers are knowledgeable, proficient, responsible and accountable in the execution of their duties

- increasing the perimeter security of the institution to minimise escapes and simultaneously increasing work, education, cultural, social and recreational programmes to relieve institutional pressures and assist in establishing order.

Currently the institution is suffering from a lack of leadership and direction, low morale among officers and inmates, constant industrial strife, a rising escape and incident rate, a poor public image and a general deterioration of conditions. The responsibility for the current situation can be shared equally by the Department, the Government, the Public Service Board, the unions and the Industrial Commission. It will take the work and co-operation of all of these bodies to remedy the situation. The paragraphs which follow briefly summarise the major findings and recommendations of the plan.
TOP AND MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

Top and middle management at the Prison can best be characterised by excessive turnover and shortages, unknown limits of authority, strong unions who override management prerogatives and strongly influence the daily operation of the Prison, and a consequent total lack of leadership, direction and control of the institution. It is vital to the safety and security of the Prison that management regain control and be allowed to exercise normal management prerogatives. To that end, the plan calls for the strengthening of the senior management structure and its limits of authority. The structure of the middle management group has also been strengthened by upgrading three positions, organising managers into three principal groups and nine distinct sub-groups, and developing clear delineations of authority and responsibility for each middle management position. In addition, top and middle management structures have been organised to minimise or virtually eliminate the need for officers to "act-up" or perform higher duties at the expense of creation of a series of acting positions.

STAFF DEPLOYMENT

The rostering system currently employed at the institution makes it extremely difficult for officers to achieve the proper level of professional competence. The constant rotating through posts does not allow officers to become fully trained or proficient in post duties and creates inconsistencies and tension in the Prison. The process is severely curtailing the institution's ability to operate in a safe and secure manner. After management, staff deployment is the second most critical area needing addressing. To correct the current situation, the plan recommends implementing a unit management approach to staff deployment. A unit management approach will ensure that officers become knowledgeable, proficient, responsible and accountable in the execution of their duties. Unit management calls for the placing of officers in small groupings or "units" that are managed by two Assistant Chief Correctional Officer I's and perform duties in a limited geographic area. Officers would be assigned to units for six months. Duties within the unit would be assigned by the unit manager in a manner which allows for the development and training of the officer, consistency in the execution of post duties and accountability for unit and post operations.
SECURITY AND PHYSICAL FACILITIES

Security at the institution has declined in recent years. The increased number of escapes and incidents point to the need to increase perimeter security and personalise the atmosphere inside the compound. To that end, the plan recommends the development of a high security perimeter, the movement of minimum security inmates outside the walls and the establishment of a unit management staff deployment process. The plan also calls for the general upgrading of the environment, including the creation of a number of indoor and outdoor recreation areas and facilities, both for staff and prisoners.

PROGRAMMES AND PRISONER PRACTICES

Programmes for prisoners and general prisoner practices at the institution are inadequate. In line with modern correctional and Departmental philosophy, the plan calls for a complete revamping of programmes and prisoner practices. An expanded range of weekday programmes, including additional education and structured recreation programmes, is recommended. An afternoon shift has been recommended to allow for extended time out of cells and evening activities, as well as improved visiting facilities and increased outlets for inmate creativity.
SECTION 2. PROJECT APPROACH
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TERMS OF REFERENCE

In early 1981, Touche Ross Services, led by Mr Hugh Swink from the USA, reviewed the Department of Correctional Services and commented on major problems at Yatala Labour Prison. However, the consultants were not asked at that time to thoroughly review the structure and operations of individual institutions.

The problems at Yatala have subsequently compounded and have led to rising concerns regarding safety, security and operational effectiveness considerations at the Prison. The Government therefore approved the engagement of Mr Hugh Swink to "recommend the action required to improve the organisation, structure and operations of the Yatala Labour Prison. In particular, the review should address:

- the management structure
- organisational arrangements for the deployment of correctional staff, including consideration of unit management concepts
- adequacy of physical facilities
- prisoner management practices, e.g. hours in cells
- prisoner programmes
- security practices."

PROJECT ORGANISATION

Mr Swink has conducted numerous reviews of correctional systems and individual institutions. His consulting credentials are recorded in Appendix C to this report. He was assisted for the duration of the project by Mr Graham Boxhall, a Public Service Board Consultant. Research was undertaken by Mr Frank Morgan of the Department of Correctional Services. Mrs Lucy Bosco of Touche Ross Services, Adelaide, provided invaluable secretarial assistance. Advice was provided during the project by Mr John Dawes, Mr David Mitchell and Mr Don Faulkner of the Public Service Board, and Mr Philip Speakman of Touche Ross Services, Adelaide. The two unions covering staff at Yatala - the Public Service Association and the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union - declined invitations to participate in the review.

The consultancy team wishes to record the excellent co-operation, courtesy and assistance provided by management and staff at Yatala and the Department of Correctional Service's Head Office.
PROJECT METHODOLOGY

Given the short time period available for the project and the existence of previous reports on similar matters, the primary purpose of this project was the preparation of a management plan for addressing the problems at Yatala Labour Prison. As most of these problems are common knowledge, and did not require lengthy explanation, the project therefore concentrated on identifying and understanding the causes of these problems, assessing possible solutions, and selecting the actions most likely to correct the basic deficiencies. To this end, the consultancy team:

- called for and reviewed submissions from interested persons
- reviewed all escape data and methods for the last 15 years
- analysed staffing data and rostering systems
- interviewed all senior managers and a wide range of staff and other persons interfacing with the Prison
- made extensive on-site observations of work posts, facilities and practices throughout the Prison and on all shifts.

The intensive analysis undertaken by the above methods culminated in the preparation of this Management Plan. The Plan provides clear direction on how the Department should address the key issues currently facing Yatala Labour Prison.
SECTION 3. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
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INTRODUCTION

High security institutions which are well and consistently run, require managers who are strong individuals, willing to decide and act; are vested with the necessary authority, responsibility and accountability to manage the day-to-day operations of the institution; and who are given clear delineation of their individual authority, responsibility and accountability.

Currently, Yatala Labour Prison is experiencing excessive management turnover, poor industrial relations and numerous temporary assignments to higher duties. This has resulted in limited leadership and direction, constantly rotating middle management, a lack of accountability and consistency, and a basically reactive management group unsure of its authority and limitations in decision making. The number, diversity and magnitude of problems experienced at Yatala, from security to programmes to administrative procedures, all point to one undeniable conclusion: a management infrastructure delineating authority, responsibility and accountability is not in place.

The problems currently being experienced at Yatala are merely symptoms of the larger problem of a lack of a proper management infrastructure to deal with daily change. Until such a structure (which extends from the Manager of the institution down to each General Duty Officer) is in place and operational, all other solutions will only be temporary, patchwork and less effective than intended.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 3.1 INTRODUCE A TOP MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION STRUCTURE WHICH IS ADEQUATELY STAFFED AND HAS CLEARLY DELINEATED LINES OF AUTHORITY AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

A strong and effective management team is essential to provide the leadership required to implement the full range of Departmental objectives within Yatala Labour Prison. Exhibit 1 sets out our recommended top management structure for the Prison. The Management Team comprises a:
RECOMMENDED TOP MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEAD OFFICE

YATALA LABOUR PRISON

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, TREATMENT SERVICES

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INSTITUTIONS

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, PRISON INDUSTRIES

CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

MANAGER, YATALA LABOUR PRISON

ASSISTANT MANAGER, PROGRAMMES

ASSISTANT MANAGER, ESTABLISHMENT

ASSISTANT MANAGER, INDUSTRIES AND PROPERTY

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

LINE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

ADVICE, ASSISTANCE AND MONITORING
- Manager
- Assistant Manager, Programmes
- Assistant Manager, Establishment
- Assistant Manager, Industries & Property
- Senior Administrative Officer.

This structure is similar to the new approved structure with the exception of the Senior Administrative Officer, who has been added to strengthen the team.

The Manager will be responsible for all aspects of the management of the Prison. He should be vested with the necessary authority to manage the institution within determined policies, guidelines and budgets. In conjunction with other management staff, he should develop and implement plans and procedures for improving the operation of the Prison.

This job is one of the key positions in the Department and should not be buried within a lengthy or diffused chain of command. While it is appropriate for the position to formally report to the Assistant Director, Institutions, this should not detract from the decision-making authority, accountability and classification level to be given to the Manager. The level of the Manager's job should be raised, if necessary, to attract high calibre management expertise.

The Assistant Manager, Programmes will be responsible for the provision of a wide range of educational, cultural, health, recreational and leisure programmes for inmates. The position would be the focal point for:

- identifying programme opportunities
- arranging for appropriate people to provide programmes
- liaising with other institutional staff to ensure the conduct of programmes meet custodial and other requirements.

This position should be viewed as an integral part of Yatala management, not as an outposted Head Office function. It should be operationally responsible for all non-industrial programme and treatment staff working at Yatala Labour Prison, including those from "contractor agencies" such as the School of Prisoner Education. This operational responsibility should include:
- co-ordinating the activities of programme staff to ensure the most efficient and effective use of resources

- facilitating liaison and co-operation between programme and other staff

- keeping programme staff informed of relevant policies, guidelines and day-to-day decisions made by Yatala management.

The Assistant Manager should not interfere in the programme staff's discharge of their professional responsibilities or in their responsibility to other institutions if not full-time at Yatala Labour Prison.

The Assistant Manager should convene regular meetings of programme, industrial and custodial staff to plan and review all aspects of Yatala's work and other programmes. These meetings should consider such aspects as the:

- duration and timetabling of specific activities
- incentives and privileges for involvement in certain activities
- movement of inmates to programme areas
- opportunities for utilising the skills and interests of staff from respective areas.

The Assistant Manager, Industries & Property (currently the Manager, Industrial Complex), should be responsible for:

- providing meaningful work programmes within the policies and procedures determined by Head Office and Yatala Labour Prison management
- running the Industrial Complex
- supervising institutional services (e.g. kitchen, laundry)
- overseeing equipment and property matters
- supervising day-to-day operation of the stores function at Yatala.

The Assistant Manager, Establishment will be responsible to the Manager for the security, control and safe custody of all prisoners. He will be responsible for the efficient and effective deployment of custodial staff. He will maintain prisoner discipline and co-ordinate the investigation of incidents within the Prison. This position will replace the existing Deputy Superintendent, Custodial position.
A Senior Administrative Officer should be appointed with responsibility for:

- administrative and financial services, including budgeting and secretarial services
- staff and inmate records
- providing personnel management services to line management
- operation of Yatala Labour Prison canteen.

The Senior Administrative Officer, with appropriate assistance, should review the administrative systems and procedures within Yatala Labour Prison. The following matters appear to warrant attention:

- secretarial/receptionist services
- research and secretarial assistance for the Classification Committee
- manual recording of financial transactions in inmates’ accounts by two clerical officers
- prisoner records
- canteen operations
- expenditure authorities.

The three Assistant Managers and the Senior Administrative Officer will have a clearly defined, day-to-day line management responsibility to the Manager, Yatala Labour Prison. Functional areas in Head Office should limit their involvement to monitoring the adequacy of operational practices and providing advice or assistance on policy and technical matters.

Creation of a competent top management team, free from all but the most critical day-to-day operational matters, would give Yatala Labour Prison the opportunity for:

- experiencing strong and effective institutional leadership
- reviewing the institution's ability to meet the Department's aims and objectives
- improving management and operational procedures
- making better use of staff and physical resources
- effectively relating to agencies external to the institution.
RECOMMENDATION 3.2  INTRODUCE A UNIT MANAGEMENT CONCEPT FOR MIDDLE MANAGEMENT AND DELINEATE BETWEEN UNIT DUTIES/RESPONSIBILITIES AND SHIFT DUTIES/RESPONSIBILITIES.

As was stated in the introduction, one of the greatest needs at Yatala Labour Prison is for accountability in the middle management group and consistency in daily operations. At present, only the Supervisor, Maintenance; Supervisor, Industry and ACCO I "S" & "D" Divisions are assigned specific areas of ongoing responsibility. The remaining personnel are rotated through a series of positions, sometimes for only one day at a time. It is next to impossible under these circumstances to fully understand, let alone execute, the responsibilities that should reside with the position. Middle managers consequently lose confidence, job satisfaction, and credibility in the eyes of staff and inmates.

As staff at Yatala have themselves recognised, accountability can best be accomplished by assigning each middle manager a specific area of responsibility, be it functional or geographical. The middle manager will then be responsible on a continuing basis throughout the year for all administrative and operational aspects of that area.

This ongoing responsibility will differ from shift responsibilities in that shift responsibilities expire with the shift. It is only through this assignment of ongoing responsibility that the institution will ever be able to extract accountability and encourage improved work performance from its middle management group.

RECOMMENDATION 3.3  DEFINE SPECIFIC UNITS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF YATALA LABOUR PRISON.

Ideally units should be defined where distinct geographic and functional areas exist. Unfortunately, Yatala Labour Prison is neither constructed nor operated in such a way that distinct units are easily established. However, it is possible to develop well defined units based on the general principles of geography and functionality. As such, we would recommend that Yatala be divided into 9 units as follows:
- "A" Division - composed of the A Division building, the assembly
  building, the kitchen, the boilerhouse, the visitors area, the exercise
  yards, the chiefs' administration office, the interview rooms, the parade
  grounds, and number 7 tower.

- "B" Division - the "B" Division building, except "S" & "D" Divisions, and
  number 6 tower.

- "S" & "D" Divisions - the cellblocks, exercise yard and adjacent
  administrative areas.

- The above three units, because of their geographic and functional
  similarities, be grouped into a larger unit called the
  ACCOMMODATION GROUP.

- Complex and Grounds - the area housing the inside compound shops, the
  area housing the outside compound shops, the new industrial complex area,
  all grounds outside the Prison walls including the officers mess and all
  towers except numbers 6, 7 and 8.

- "C" Division - the "C" Division buildings and adjacent recreational areas.

- The above two units, because of their geographic similarities only,
  be grouped into a larger unit called the COMPLEX GROUP until such
  time as "C" Division is moved from the Prison.

- Northfield Security Hospital - the gate area, grounds and buildings of
  the Northfield Security Hospital and number 8 tower.

- Perimeter Security - all of the walls and gates surrounding the main
  Prison.

- Administration and Movement - all escorts, hospital watches and movements
  of prisoners off of Prison property.
Surveillance Room – the surveillance room and all its associated communications and surveillance equipment.

- The above 4 units, because of their functional similarities, be grouped into a larger unit called the **SECURITY GROUP**.

While we believe these units to be the most logical for Yatala, we recognise the unit concept is more important than the specific configuration of units actually adopted. Therefore Departmental and Institutional management should feel free to make any changes deemed appropriate.

**RECOMMENDATION 3.4** STRENGTHEN THE CAPABILITY AND CONSISTENCY OF THE MIDDLE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE BY PROVIDING ADEQUATE POSITIONS AND CREATING CLEAR LINES OF AUTHORITY AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

Exhibit 2 illustrates the recommended middle management structure for Yatala Labour Prison. The existing complement of one Chief Correctional Officer III, four Assistant Chief Correctional Officer II's and 21 Assistant Chief Correctional Officer I's has been upgraded to one Principal Correctional Officer, three Chief Correctional Officer III's, four Assistant Chief Correctional Officer II's and 18 Assistant Chief Correctional Officer I's. The total number of 26 custodial middle management positions remains the same.

**Principal Correctional Officer:** The Principal Correctional Officer is a new weekday, 8.00 am - 5.00 pm job at the PO 7 or PO 8 level. This position will essentially perform the duties currently being performed by the CCO III, which consist primarily of the daily running of the institution. This position will work closely with the Assistant Manager, Establishment, the two positions covering for each other in periods of absence of less than 4 weeks. The position will have direct line authority over the three CCO III positions.
Chief Correctional Officer III: The creation of two additional CCO III's will allow for each of the three primary areas (accommodation, complex and grounds, and security) to have a permanent manager, classified commensurate with the amount of responsibility inherent in a high security institution such as Yatala. Each CCO III position should be associated with one of the three designated areas. As such, when the positions are called, they should be called specifically as CCO III Yatala Accommodation Group, CCO III Yatala Complex and Grounds Group, and CCO III Yatala Security Group.

If an individual becomes incapable, for whatever reason, of filling his specific position, he should be transferred from that CCO III position and a new CCO III appointed. The transferred officer should be assigned to other appropriate duties and remain at the CCO III level. However, if his transfer involves the creation of a new position to accommodate him, that position would not be filled when vacated by the transferred officer.

Responsibilities of CCO III's: CCO III's are responsible for all aspects of the administration and operation of their group. They will develop operating instructions for their group and ensure adherence to those instructions. They will undertake frequent checks of physical security and operating procedures within units under their control and initiate action to correct deficiencies. They will hold regular meetings with their unit managers to review units' performance and to communicate information from institutional management. Their responsibility for the overall operation of each group cannot be transferred to any other individual. While day-to-day operating decisions may be made by others in his absence, the CCO III will maintain ongoing responsibility for any changes which may occur in the overall administration or operation of his group. The CCO III's will stand weekend duty every third weekend and will function as the senior officer-in-charge of the institution.

Assistant Chief Correctional Officer II: Three of the existing ACCO II's will function as deputies to the CCO III's and the fourth ACCO II will function as officer-in-charge of the surveillance room. ACCO II's, like CCO III's, will be associated with designated areas, should be called for specific areas, and, if incapable of standing that duty, should be removed and replaced.
Deputy ACCO II's will carry the same general responsibilities as their respective ACCO III and will be the senior officer-in-charge of the group if the CCO III is not present. ACCO II's will also act as unit managers when neither of the ACCO I's of a particular unit are present. When the ACCO II is not on duty, the CCO III will cover his responsibilities. As such, the CCO III and ACCO II in a group should be rostered so that one or the other is always on weekday duty. ACCO II's will stand weekend duty every fourth weekend and will function as the second-in-charge of the institution.

Assistant Chief Correctional Officer I: There will be 18 ACCO I's, two assigned to each of the nine functional units. The two ACCO I's in a unit will co-manage the unit and will carry the same level of responsibility for the unit as the CCO III does for the group. They will develop unit instructions, ensure all officers in the unit are trained in their duties and that unit instructions are executed uniformly. They will inspect their units regularly and recommend any needed changes to their group leader. They will periodically review the performance of and counsel with all officers assigned to their unit. The two ACCO I's should be rostered so that one or the other is always on day duty. An ACCO I should only be required to undertake higher duties when both the CCO III and the ACCO II are not present.

All ACCO I's will stand surveillance room duty as well as weekends and first and second watches.

RECOMMENDATION 3.5 IMPLEMENT A ROSTERING METHODOLOGY FOR MIDDLE MANAGEMENT TO ALLOW FOR CONSISTENCY IN UNIT MANAGEMENT.

Each unit or group has been designed so that there are two middle managers responsible for that unit or group. The rostering system for the CCO III's and ACCO II's should be separate from that of the ACCO I's and should ensure that, at a minimum, either the ACCO II or the CCO III for each group is on day duty every Monday through Friday. One of the two will be considered adequate to manage the group and therefore it will not be necessary for ACCO I's to act in a higher position in the event of one of the two being rostered off.
CCO III's will be rostered every third weekend to act as senior officer-in-charge of the institution and ACCO II's will be rostered every fourth weekend to act as second-in-charge. Neither will be required to stand first or second watches.

ACCO I's should be rostered so that one of the two unit managers is on duty on all days. However, as all ACCO I's will be required to stand surveillance room and first and second watches, it will not be possible to always have each unit covered by an ACCO I each day of the week. In the event an ACCO I is not assigned to a unit on a particular day, the ACCO II in that unit's group will be responsible for managing the unit.

**RECOMMENDATION 3.6  REVIEW THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING ACCO I'S TO MAN THE SURVEILLANCE ROOM.**

The review team considers the middle management structure of 26 chief and assistant chief correctional officers to be adequate to manage an institution the size of Yatala Labour Prison. However, the requirement that only ACCOs man the surveillance room is both an inefficient use of management talent and a deterrent to effective unit management continuity. In order that ACCO I's can be rostered to their units more frequently, we believe the Department should consider training a group of General Duty or Senior Correctional Officers who would be available for rostering to the surveillance room to serve as the second person on the surveillance room weekday watch as well as the manning officer on the two night watches. This would free ACCO I's to function more frequently in a managerial role.
RECOMMENDATION 3.7 DEVELOP A DEPARTMENTAL POLICY REGARDING MIDDLE MANAGEMENT ASSIGNMENT TO AND MOVEMENT BETWEEN UNITS.

It is important that the Department have a clear policy regarding the assignment to and movement between various management units. As stated earlier, it is recommended that CCO III and ACCO II positions be called for specific groups. In the event of a vacancy occurring, the Manager of the institution should be allowed the option of recommending the lateral movement of an existing CCO III to a vacant CCO III position (or ACCO II to a vacant ACCO II position) prior to calling for applicants, and then calling for the new vacancy. It is recommended that ACCO I’s be appointed without regard to a particular group and that movement between units occur at the discretion of the Prison Manager. ACCO I’s should be encouraged to rotate every 12 - 18 months to enable them to understand different management approaches and to afford them a full understanding of institutional operations.

RECOMMENDATION 3.8 FILL EXISTING MANAGEMENT VACANCIES WITH CAPABLE PERSONNEL AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND IMPLEMENT A POLICY OF "COVERING" WITHIN UNITS RATHER THAN MAKING NUMEROUS SHORT TERM HIGHER DUTY APPOINTMENTS.

Four of the top nine positions in the institution are currently filled on an acting basis. An additional five middle management positions are vacant. This is creating a great deal of uncertainty, undermining authority and causing a great many inconsistencies in the management of the institution. Before any of the recommendations in this Management Plan can be effectively implemented, it will be necessary to fill the existing vacancies with capable personnel.
INTRODUCTION

Maintaining effective control over the day-to-day operations of an institution is dependent on professionally competent officers who are instilled with a clear understanding of their responsibility, authority and accountability; are trained and knowledgeable in individual post operations; are cognizant of the inmates and the surrounding environment; are consistent in their actions; and who add to the personalised atmosphere of the institution.

Currently, officers at Yatala Labour Prison find it difficult to achieve this level of professional competence. Under the current rostering system, officers are rostered to different posts throughout the institution on a rotating basis. It would be unusual for an officer to stand a particular post for longer than seven days or to be rotated to that post more frequently than twice a year. While this has the benefit of giving all officers the opportunity to stand all the posts in the institution, it has several major negative effects on institutional safety, security and operations:

- officers are not assigned to posts long enough to become fully trained and proficient in the execution of post responsibilities
- officers are not assigned to posts long enough to develop an understanding of the inmates associated with the post or their movements
- officers don't have time to develop a "feel" or sixth sense about a post and its routines before being rotated off
- inmates have a much better understanding than officers of how most posts should operate and where the weaknesses are
- different officers execute post duties in a different manner, causing inconsistencies and hence misunderstandings and frustrations among inmates
- many officers develop poor attitudes and work habits and are reluctant to take responsibility for improving posts as they know they will be rostered to a different post within a week
- officers do not work for one supervisor long enough to be given adequate appraisals of performance. This means officers are getting neither positive nor corrective feedback.
The Manager position is particularly critical to the future success of the institution. The necessary qualifications include strong leadership abilities, an in-depth knowledge of the operation of high security prisons, and the ability to succeed in a high stress environment. Because of the critical nature of the Manager position, should no suitable candidates be available locally, we would recommend an interstate or international search for a proven professional. The acquisition of such a person may necessitate the negotiation of salary and conditions superior to those currently being offered.

Another source of inconsistencies is the constant need for middle managers to "act-up" for superiors who are not on duty. We have recommended a sufficient structure which should eliminate the need for this occurring in the future. In the top management group, any four of the top five positions should be able to adequately operate the institution and "cover" the duties of the fifth for short periods of time of four weeks or less without the need for anyone to formally act in another position. Similarly the Assistant Manager, Establishment and the Principal Custodial Officer should be able to cover the short term (4 weeks or less) absences of one another without the need for any CCO III to act as Principal Custodial Officer. All of the CCO III's have a deputy ACCO II in their group and hence they should be able to adequately cover for one another's absences for any period of time without requiring an ACCO I to perform higher duties. The ACCO II's can also provide for individual unit management where both ACCO I's are absent.
RECOMMENDATION 4.2  ESTABLISH SPECIFIC UNITS AT YATALA LABOUR PRISON AND RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

As discussed in the previous section, units should be developed along distinct geographical and functional lines. Yatala Labour Prison is not constructed or operated in a way that allows units to be developed in an optimal manner. However, sufficient geographic and functional separation does exist to allow for the development of units which will satisfy basic unit management concepts and provide adequate opportunities for staff to rotate among different types of duty posts. We recommend that Yatala Labour Prison be divided into eight units encompassing the following geographic areas and posts:

- "A" Division - composed of the A Division building, the assembly building, the kitchen, the boilerhouse, the visitors area, the exercise yards, the chiefs' administration office, the interview rooms, the parade grounds, and number 7 tower.

- "B" Division - the "B" Division building, except "S" & "D" Divisions, and number 6 tower.

- "S" & "D" Divisions - the cellblocks, exercise yard and adjacent administrative areas.

- Complex and Grounds - the area housing the inside compound shops, the area housing the outside compound shops, the new industrial complex area, all grounds outside the Prison walls including the officers mess, and all towers except numbers 6, 7 and 8.

- "C" Division - the "C" Division buildings and adjacent recreational areas.

- Northfield Security Hospital - the gate area, grounds and buildings of the Northfield Security Hospital and number 8 tower.
SECTION 4. STAFF DEPLOYMENT
- **Perimeter Security** - all of the walls and gates surrounding the main prison.

- **Administration and Movement** - all escorts, hospital watches and movements of prisoners off of prison property.

Exhibit 3 on the following page lists the currently defined weekday posts that would be grouped within each of the units. These groupings should be closely challenged by institutional management and adjusted as appropriate prior to implementation. On an ongoing basis, both the number and composition of units should be altered in response to changes in the institution's needs.

**RECOMMENDATION 4.3 ASSIGN OFFICERS TO SPECIFIC UNITS AND DEVELOP A POLICY REGARDING TRANSFERS BETWEEN UNITS.**

Once units and their associated desired weekday manning strength have been defined, it will be necessary to assign officers to specific units. This could be done in a number of different ways. The consulting team suggests that officers be allowed to submit a request listing their order of preference for three units, with any explanation, if desired. Prison management should then make final assignment to both units and rostering groups. New staff should be assigned in a similar manner, tempered by unit vacancies and priority of need.

Officers should be assigned to units for a minimum of six months. At the end of that time they may request to stay in the unit or to transfer to another unit, listing their preference as above. Management should determine final movement with the only restriction being they should not keep an officer in a unit if he has asked to be moved from that unit.
These deficiencies are unacceptable and cannot be allowed to continue. They have caused a great deal of frustration among officers, have contributed to the low morale presently being experienced at the Prison and have SEVERELY curtailed the institution's ability to operate in a safe and secure manner. It is critical to the operation of the institution that this situation be addressed and resolved as quickly as possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 4.1 IMPLEMENT A UNIT MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO STAFF DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT OFFICERS BECOME KNOWLEDGEABLE, PROFICIENT, RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE IN THE EXECUTION OF THEIR DUTIES.

The consulting team strongly recommends that the current practice of rotating officers through institutional posts on a fortnightly basis be terminated. This is the single most de-stabilizing factor in the institution. In place of this practice we recommend dividing officers into smaller groupings or "units". These units would perform duties in specific geographical areas and be managed by two ACCO I's. Rotating through a smaller number of posts, working in the same geographic area with the same inmate movements, and performing fewer duties for the same ACCO I's would allow for:

- better officer growth and development
- better communication and understanding between staff
- better control of the cleanliness and maintenance of the institution
- better observation of inmates, enabling early detection of problems before they reach critical proportions
- involvement of staff in the improvement of procedures and facilities
- accountability for performance of duties and improvement of operations
- a sense of belonging and closer relations between management and staff
- opportunities for personal achievement, recognition and a sense of pride.

The concept of unit management has long been a mainstay of larger prisons throughout the United States. The U.S. Federal Prison system found that upon implementing unit management in the late 60's and early 70's, incident reports decreased by 20 - 30% in institutions. Unit management has the effect of taking large, impersonal organisations and making them small effective teams working together to improve the environment. This has a positive effect on both inmates and staff and results in a better operated institution.
RECOMMENDED COMPOSITION OF UNITS
(WEEKDAY DUTY AREAS)

YATALA LABOUR PRISON

"A" DIVISION UNIT
ACCO I (2)
SCO YARD
SCO A KEYS
A TOP
A MIDDLE
A BARRIER
A FLOORS
A SECURITY UT.
LIBRARY
NO. 1 P.C.
NO. 2 P.C.
NO. 7 TOWER
(13)

"B" DIVISION UNIT
ACCO I (2)
SCO B KEYS
B MIDDLE
B TOP
B UT. NO. 1
B UT. NO. 2
B STAIRS
B BARRIER
B SECURITY
B FLOORS
TAILORS
NO. 6 TOWER
(13)

"S" & "D" DIVISIONS UNIT
ACCO I (2)
SCO KEYS
S BARRIER
S WORKSHOP
S OFFICER
D OFFICER NO. 1
D OFFICER NO. 2
7.00 AM OFFICER
(9)

PERIMETER SECURITY UNIT
ACCO I (2)
SCO CENSOR
SCO FRONT
SCO BACK
WEST TOWER
WEST GATE
GARDEN (NEW FRONT)
(8)

COMPLEX AND GROUNDS UNIT

"C" DIVISION UNIT
ACCO I (2)
C DIV. NO. 1
C DIV. NO. 2
(4)

NORTHFIELD SECURITY HOSPITAL UNIT
ACCO I (2)
SEC. HOSPITAL
NO. 8 TOWER
(4)

ADMINISTRATION AND MOVEMENT UNIT
ACCO I (2)
SPARES (12)
DRIVERS (4)
MED. ORDERLIES (3)
(21)

LAUNDRY BARRIER
LAUNDRY TOWER
(12)
RECOMMENDATION 4.4  DEVELOP A ROSTERING METHODOLOGY TO ENSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF OFFICERS TO STAFF EACH UNIT.

Currently officers are divided into nine rostering groups and rostered through a specific pattern of shifts and days-off over a nine week period. The pattern is designed so that five groups are always rostered to weekday duty, three groups to weekend duty and one group each to first and second watches. If this method is to be retained, then it will be necessary to divide unit staff among the nine groups so that sufficient staff are available for each unit on each shift. For example, there are 11 desired weekday posts assigned to "A" Division unit. Since five roster groups are rostered on each weekday, it would be necessary to place three officers in each of those groups so that coverage would be adequate (15) after allowing for absences. Placing three "A" Division unit officers in each rostering group would bring the total unit strength to 27 (9 groups x 3 officers). Exhibit 4 illustrates how this would be accomplished if the units suggested in Recommendation 4.2 were adopted. In the event of unit staff shortages and surpluses, Group CCO III's will work with their respective unit managers to determine how best to deal with the situation. The Principal Custodial Officer will work with CCO III's to deal with group staff shortages and surpluses.

RECOMMENDATION 4.5  ESTABLISH A PROCEDURE FOR ASSIGNING DUTIES WITHIN A UNIT.

There are a number of acceptable options available for assigning duties within a unit. The consulting team believes the most practical is one in which the ACCO I's managing the unit are responsible for assigning duties. Each unit management team would establish its own assignment mechanism, with the primary goals being:

- development and training of the officer
- consistency in the execution of post duties
- accountability for unit and post operations
## RECOMMENDED STAFFING OF UNITS AND ROSTERING GROUPS

### YATALA LABOUR PRISON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL OFFICERS ASSIGNED</th>
<th>OFFICERS PER ROSTER GROUP</th>
<th>AVAILABLE WEEKDAY SHIFT</th>
<th>REQUIRED WEEKDAY SHIFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot; DIVISION</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;B&quot; DIVISION</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;S&quot; &amp; &quot;D&quot; DIVISION</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;C&quot; DIVISION</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERIMETER SECURITY</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1 or 2 (2/3)</td>
<td>7 - 10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHFIELD SECURITY HOSPITAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 (2/3)</td>
<td>2 - 5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLEX AND GROUNDS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATION (M.O.)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (1/3)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>18 - 20</td>
<td>92 - 98</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE:* Weekday shift - 5 groups are rostered  
Weekend shift - 3 groups are rostered  
First watch - 1 group is rostered  
Second watch - 1 group is rostered
While individual officers have individual learning curves, it is recommended that initially officers be rostered to only one or two posts over a 3 month period. This should allow sufficient time for officers to become proficient in the execution of duties. Some duties, which require greater skills or continuity, should be staffed by the same officer for longer periods of time. In addition to the assignment of duties, the ACCO I in charge of the unit should have the responsibility on an hourly and daily basis for determining which posts will be manned and where additional officers are needed to meet the needs of the situation. In other words, the unit manager will deploy his staff in a manner which is most consistent with the safety, security and operational effectiveness of the institution.

RECOMMENDATION 4.6 IMPLEMENT A REGULAR FORMAL COMMUNICATION LINK TO OFFICERS

Information from prison management and the Head Office needs to be communicated on a formal and regular basis to all General Duty Officers. Present communication is often unclear or incomplete with no mechanism for officers to inquire further regarding specific items. To resolve this situation, it is recommended that unit managers hold regular briefings with all the members of their unit. These could be short, informal meetings held at the beginning or end of a watch on a fortnightly basis. Information regarding the unit, Prison or Department could be disseminated and officers would have the opportunity to express concerns or seek clarification.
RECOMMENDATION 4.7 IMPLEMENT MANPOWER PLANNING AND RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES WHICH ANTICIPATE STAFFING NEEDS AT YATALA LABOUR PRISON

The actual number of custodial staff employed at Yatala Labour Prison falls substantially short of the recognised establishment level. Over the last 19 months, Yatala was on average 11% (or 17 officers) short of Correctional Officers and Senior Correctional Officers, and 23% (6 officers) short of Assistant Chief and Chief Correctional Officers. Running an average of 23 officers short for such an extended period of time has contributed to:

- a very high level of overtime (see Appendix B)
- an average call-back requirement for more than 12 officers per day
- extensive acting in higher level positions
- frequent closure of industrial workshops, particularly in more recent months, with the consequent detrimental impact on production, industry officers’ morale and the time available for inmates to be constructively occupied.

More critically, this high vacancy rate adds to the inconsistencies of action and lack of accountability that seriously hinders Yatala’s operations.

The financial and operational consequences of staff shortfalls should be minimised by recruiting and training additional staff before vacancies occur. A study of attrition rates in various grades and other factors influencing staffing levels will indicate potential shortfalls to be offset by additional recruitment. The Public Service Act’s provisions for the appointment of temporary extra assistance could be used to employ graduates of training programmes who cannot immediately be given a permanent position.

A planned approach to maintaining custodial staff numbers at full strength should be initiated by Head Office management services staff in consultation with the Manager, Yatala Labour Prison and the Department’s Training Officer. Yatala’s Senior Administrative Officer and Head Office’s Management Services section should regularly review the staffing situation and ensure that appropriate numbers of officers are being trained to fill base-grade and promotional vacancies.
SECTION 5. SECURITY
INTRODUCTION

Yatala Labour Prison presently serves as South Australia's primary high security prison. The role of a high security prison is threefold:

- to protect society by providing for a high security perimeter which will minimise the number of incidents of escape
- to establish order and community and provide for the safety and welfare of staff and prisoners via the establishment of meaningful work, education, cultural, social and recreational programmes
- to provide for the future protection of society by offering programmes of rehabilitation designed to assist prisoners in leading productive lives on release.

Currently, the perimeter at Yatala Labour Prison could not be classified as high security. This can be concluded through observation of the physical design and is born out by recent escape data. During the twelve year period 1968 through 1979, Yatala experienced 13 escapes of maximum and medium security prisoners or 0.4 escapes per 100 prisoners per year. During the last 3½ years, there have been 22 escapes of maximum or medium security prisoners or 2.5 escapes per 100 prisoners per year. This is an increase of sixfold. This dramatic increase in escapes indicates the need to re-evaluate perimeter security at the Prison.

In addition, the work, education, cultural, social and recreational programmes are sadly lacking as indicated by observation of the daily prison routine and reviewing the incident data of the Prison. During the last seven months 70 class "A", or serious, incidents have occurred in South Australian prisons and gaols. Forty-three or 61% of these occurred at Yatala. Twenty-six of the forty-three resulted in injuries to staff or prisoners. This high rate of incidents is indicative of the tensions among inmates and between inmates and staff.
The inter-relationship of perimeter security and prison programmes needs to be emphasised. Increasing perimeter security and thereby reducing escapes will cause pressure and frustrations to build up in the institution. Establishing meaningful work, education, cultural, social and recreational programmes will relieve institutional pressures and assist in establishing order, but the consequent increased movement within the institution will increase opportunities for escape attempts. It is therefore important to recognise that increasing perimeter security without increasing prison programmes and vice versa could be disastrous.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 5.1 ESTABLISH A HIGH SECURITY PERIMETER AROUND YATALA LABOUR PRISON

Fifteen of the 35 escapes by maximum and medium security prisoners during the period 1968 to 1983 were accomplished by breaching the perimeter of Yatala Labour Prison. In addition, the perimeter is easily accessible to outsiders who can throw contraband over the walls. In order to minimise the number of escapes and protect against the entry of contraband via the perimeter, it is recommended that a high security perimeter be established around the prison. A high security perimeter is defined as follows:

- a double barrier (high security fences or walls with inhibitors along the top) between prisoners and the outside grounds at all times

- a minimum number (usually two) of controlled entry/exit points (gates)

- a well lighted perimeter with broad "no-man's" lands on either side

- surveillance cameras and/or sensors and/or visual observation around the interior of the inside and/or outside barriers.
To install a high security perimeter around Yatala will require the following specific changes:

- install razor wire and surveillance equipment around the inside of the new complex and compound shop wall

- remove all outside structures within 50 metres of the Prison including officer housing, the outside shops and the old garage. Only the stable should remain on prison property and within 50 metres of the Prison wall

- negotiate the purchase of additional land near the northwest and southwest corners of the Prison to allow for adequate space between existing walls and new perimeter barrier

- level all land within 50 metres of the Prison wall and plant grass

- install a second perimeter barrier around the entire Prison complex. The barrier should be a non-climbable, man-proof fence of 3.5 - 4.0 metres in height with inhibitors such as razor wire around the top. The barrier should have only two gates, should be no closer to the Prison walls than 10 metres at any point and should follow the general contour as illustrated in Exhibit 5

- install a similar perimeter barrier around the outside compound shops area to allow that area to be used for recreation and still maintain a double barrier between inmates and the outside grounds

- install lighting around the outer perimeter. The lights should be high enough and bright enough to provide good visibility at least 15 metres on either side of the outer perimeter

- develop a roadway around the outside of the outer perimeter

- create a level, grassed no-man's land between the two perimeter barriers

- install surveillance cameras or sensors around the interior of one or both of the two perimeters
allow only two entry/exit points in the outer perimeter; one in the front for access to the main gate, laundry gate and Northfield Security Hospital gate; and one in the back for access to the outer western gate

- upgrade security procedures at both gates to include common modern practices of high security institutions

- demolish the southeast tower overlooking the Northfield Security Hospital gate and build a new tower in the same location high enough to view the entire top of the inner perimeter wall of the Hospital and with slanted glass to minimise glare and allow for weapons access

It is critical that Northfield Security Hospital be included within the high security perimeter system, particularly in light of the opening of the new infirmary wing.

**RECOMMENDATION 5.2**  **MOVE MINIMUM SECURITY "C" DIVISION INMATES OUTSIDE THE PRISON PERIMETER.**

The practice of housing minimum security prisoners inside the perimeter of a high security institution such as Yatala presents several problems:

- there is excessive movement of prisoners through perimeter gates

- there are contacts between high security prisoners who are restricted to the perimeter and those who are allowed outside (contraband)

- "walk-aways" are treated by the press and perceived by the public to be the same as escapes by high security prisoners. This causes a misconception by the public of the relative security of the institution. Over half the "escapes" from Yatala in the last 15 years have in reality been "walk-aways" by minimum security prisoners

- the more restrictive environment of a high security prison is not necessary nor is it in the best interest of minimum security prisoners.
The consultancy team recommends that a portion of the minimum security prisoners be moved to new housing on the grounds outside of the main prison, where they can work in the garage, officers' mess, garden and outside areas. The balance should be moved to minimum security facilities such as Cadell.

RECOMMENDATION 5.3   INTRODUCE A UNIT MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO STAFF DEPLOYMENT TO ENSURE PROPER EXECUTION OF DEPARTMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS AND TO PERSONALISE THE INSTITUTION.

Twenty of the thirty-five escapes by high security inmates during the period 1968 to 1983 were accomplished by moving undetected through a gate or by eluding an escort. This type of escape is minimised by having a highly trained unit of officers who understand and execute proper security procedures at gates and on escorts. In addition, the high rate of incidents in the institution can be lowered by having officers stationed in one area long enough to provide consistency (lowering prisoner frustration levels) and understand prisoners well enough to detect potential problems. Both of these goals can be accomplished by introducing a unit management approach to staff deployment (see Section 4 recommendations).

RECOMMENDATION 5.4   INTRODUCE MORE PRISONER PROGRAMMES AND INCREASE TIME OUT OF CELLS AND RECREATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURES OF THE INSTITUTION.

As discussed in the introduction to this section, the high incident rate at Yatala Labour Prison is a reflection of the tension among inmates and between staff and inmates. This tension will be increased with the introduction of increased security. It is therefore critical to the safety and security of staff and prisoners that programmatic and recreational activities as well as time out of cells be increased. Sections 7. and 8. which follow discuss detail recommendations in these areas.
RECOMMENDATION 5.5  ABANDON THE PRACTICE OF MANNING THE NORTHEAST TOWER DURING FIRST AND SECOND WATCHES.

The manning of the northeast tower during the first and second watches adds nothing to the security and safety of the institution. The tower view overlaps the inside perimeter coverage of Yatala and the coverage of Northfield Security Hospital provided by the other manned tower. Manning two towers which provide coverage for the same wall requires that at least one of the towers be facing into the lights used to illuminate the area. This excessive glare can be eliminated by abandoning the northeast tower and having all lighting pointed in that direction. In the event of heavy rains or poor visibility, the patrolling officer, whose effectiveness would be limited by the weather, could man the tower.

RECOMMENDATION 5.6  ADDRESS OTHER SECURITY DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN PREVIOUS REVIEWS AND REPORTS.

A number of reports have been issued internally and externally regarding security at Yatala Labour Prison. Among externally produced reports are the Cassidy, Touche Ross and Royal Commission findings. The Department should proceed with the implementation of recommendations contained in those documents, the majority of which are still valid.
SECTION 6. PHYSICAL FACILITIES
INTRODUCTION

Adequate physical facilities play a major role in contributing to the level of staff satisfaction and performance and the establishment of order in an institution. Poor accommodation, work and recreational facilities add to the frustrations and tensions brought about by imprisonment and the consequent working and living in a closed environment.

Yatala Labour Prison has recently completed a new industrial complex and is in the process of completing new educational facilities and greatly improved cell accommodation. There remains a general lack of suitable space and facilities for inmate and officer recreation and inmate visiting. The previous section has discussed the need for introducing new programmes, activities and inmate practices to relieve institutional pressures and provide for the welfare of prisoners and staff alike. This section will discuss the physical upgrades needed to accommodate those recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 6.1 PROVIDE ADEQUATE OUTDOOR RECREATIONAL AREAS AND ALL-WEATHER RECREATIONAL FACILITIES FOR INMATES.

There are three potential sites for the development of recreational areas and facilities. All three sites should be used as such. The area where the spray, sheetmetal and joiners shops are currently located should be levelled and developed into a grass oval surrounded by a running track. An all-weather facility, including a gymnasium, weight-lifting room and games area should be built in the area where "C" Division is currently located, with the tennis courts remaining as they are. The other workshop area adjacent to the brickyard should be grassed as a general recreation or "quiet" area and reserved for future recreational facilities such as a swimming pool.

In addition to the above changes, consideration should be given to removing the hard surface from several of the exercise yards and replacing them with grass. In general, the institution's aesthetic qualities should be up-graded by introducing planters and grass areas wherever feasible.
RECOMMENDATION 6.2 CREATE LOUNGE AREAS FOR EVENING OUT OF CELL ACTIVITIES ON ALL FLOORS OF "A" AND "B" DIVISIONS.

Current plans call for the eventual moving of the library, boot shop, tailor shop, and educational programs to the new industries complex. The weight-lifting and games room should eventually be moved to the new all-weather facility. These spaces, along with a portion of the showers in "A" Division and other unused facilities, should be converted to lounge areas with tables, chairs and television sets where reading, relaxing and socialising could occur.

RECOMMENDATION 6.3 BUILD A NEW INMATE VISITING CENTRE WITH ADEQUATE SPACE AND FURNISHINGS FOR LONGER AND LESS STRESSFUL VISITS.

The current visiting facilities are poorly situated inside the main compound, are not large enough to accommodate adequate visitors and are not conducive to stress relieving visits with family and friends. The Department should build new facilities either where the current training facilities are or slightly in front. The facilities should be three to four times as large as current facilities, should be furnished with comfortable chairs and lounges and should include an area for selling prison-made crafts and goods as well as a nursery for children.

RECOMMENDATION 6.4 BUILD A NEW STAFF TRAINING FACILITY.

If recommendation 6.3 is implemented, it will become necessary to find new space for officer training programmes. The consultancy team recommends the building of a new facility near the front entrance to Prison property to accommodate training for General Duty Officers as well as advanced courses for management.
RECOMMENDATION 6.5 REVIEW STAFF PHYSICAL FITNESS AND RECREATIONAL NEEDS.

Staff are encouraged to stay physically fit in order to properly and safely execute many of their duties. Currently, the Department does little to encourage either physical fitness or recreation on the part of the staff. As such, the consultancy team recommends that the Department undertake a review of staff physical fitness and recreational needs and consider building, adjacent to the new training centre:

- a gymnasium
- tennis and squash courts
- an oval and lawn bar-b-que area
- a swimming pool.

These facilities would be made available to all Departmental staff and their immediate families.
SECTION 7. INMATE PROGRAMMES
SECTION 7. INMATE PROGRAMMES

INTRODUCTION

In line with Departmental objectives, Yatala Labour Prison has an obligation to make available programmes which enable inmates to undertake meaningful work; to maintain or improve social, educational and technical skills; and to satisfy their physical, mental and spiritual needs.

In order to meet this obligation, a wide range of programmes must be integrated into the daily functioning of the Prison. It is of paramount importance to recognise the interdependence of programme and custodial activities in contributing to the effective and humane management of prisoners.

Yatala Labour Prison's current approach to inmate programmes is out dated and inappropriate. The lack of commitment to meeting its obligations in this area is evidenced by the:

- limited or non-existent cultural, recreational, rehabilitative, social skills and education programmes

- failure of custodial staff to recognise the importance of inmate programmes or to adopt a supportive attitude to programmes

- competition between various activities for the limited time available to conduct programmes

- failure of Yatala management to initiate and support programmes or to foster an appreciation of the purposes and benefits of the programmes that are available

- lengthy delay in commissioning the new Industrial Complex

- frequent closure of workshops due to staff absences.
RECOMMENDATION 7.1  EXPAND THE RANGE OF DAY PROGRAMMES OFFERED AT YATALA LABOUR PRISON AND INCREASE THE TIME AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE

Inmates at Yatala Labour Prison have limited opportunity or incentive to be fully engaged in constructive activities. Existing programmes only partially succeed in keeping inmates occupied, let alone meeting more positive objectives such as providing outlets for energies, developing skills or preparing for release. Effectively, only about five hours per weekday is currently available for work and education activities. Health, professional, legal and similar consultations also occur during this short period. Key statistics on participation in existing programmes are shown in Exhibit 6.

Inmates should be given the choice of participating in a wide range of work, educational and recreational programmes or remaining in their cells. Initial assessment and regular counselling to ascertain inmate needs and advise on suitable programmes is an integral component of an expanded approach to programmes.

Improved operating procedures and the use of the new Industrial and Education Complexes will reduce time spent on movements around the Prison (e.g. for lunch breaks) and for attending professional and similar consultations. The consequent increase in time available for programme activities will enable the maintenance of appropriate time for industry work while permitting time off for educational and recreational pursuits.

RECOMMENDATION 7.2  DEVELOP POLICY AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES TO CLEARLY DELINEATE THE RANGE OF DAY PROGRAMMES TO BE OFFERED AND THE TIME THAT INMATES CAN SPEND IN EACH PROGRAMME

Head Office, after consultation with Yatala management, should promulgate a clear statement of Departmental policy on the relative importance, and appropriate time to be allocated to, different programmes. Yatala management should then develop a timetable and operating procedures covering the range of programmes to be operated within the institution.
PRISONER PROGRAMME PARTICIPATION

YATALA LABOUR PRISON

1. NUMBERS OF INMATES EMPLOYED ON WORK PROGRAMMES (approx. figures at 17.2.83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Services</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buildings, Yard, etc</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Employed</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Inmates</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. INMATES INVOLVED IN EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

- 50 Inmates attend the 9 half-day classroom sessions, mainly in numeracy, literacy, migrant English and computer programming.
  . average of 11 inmates per session
  . approximately half are double session attenders.
- An additional 30 - 40 inmates attend via classroom call-offs each week for one-off interviews and tutoring.
- Significant involvement in correspondence courses.

3. OTHER PROGRAMMES

- Guitar course: 2 hours per week for 10 weeks, 8 inmates.
- Stress management course: 2 hours per week for 6 - 8 weeks, 10 inmates.
- Discharge course: 2 hours per week for 6 - 8 weeks, 30 inmates.
- Proposed first offender induction course.
For example, management may decide to adopt an approach to inmate programmes along the lines of the following illustration:

- all physically and psychologically able inmates are expected to undertake paid work for at least a standard 24 hour week based on 4 six hour days

- within this 24 hour week, paid time off will be granted for required health and professional consultations and for two half-day formal education courses each week

- worksites will, wherever possible, operate a 4½ day week, providing inmates with a rostered half-day and a discretionary or floating half-day off

- rostered half-days will be used for recreational activities, buys and other special activities

- inmates can use discretionary half-days to attend specific educational, cultural, recreational, treatment or discharge programmes, (including practice for debating, sports or drama groups), or where sufficient flexibility exists, staying in the workshops to do special training, personal work or overtime.

RECOMMENDATION 7.3 EXTEND THE RANGE OF EDUCATION PROGRAMMES BY USING ADDITIONAL CLASSROOMS AND HOURLY PAID INSTRUCTORS

The improved facilities being constructed in the new Education Complex will enable Yatala to offer more education programmes to underpin the work of other staff in the institution. In conjunction with the Assistant Director, Programmes and other programme and industrial staff, the School of Prisoner Education should expand its activities in the areas of:
regular courses and seminars designed to assist inmates to cope with life within and outside the institution (e.g. basic literacy and numeracy, social skills, confidence building, stress management, induction and pre-release information sessions, etc.)

- tutoring inmates studying for formal qualifications

- vocational and specific skill courses in conjunction with Correctional Industry Officers

Education programmes should make extensive use of resources from the community, including hourly paid instructors, and from within Yatala. The consultancy team believes that it will not be necessary to have General Duty Officers patrolling inside the new Education Complex.

**RECOMMENDATION 7.4**  **CONDUCT STRUCTURED RECREATIONAL PROGRAMMES DURING ROSTERED HALF-DAYS OFF**

Confinement in prison frequently leads to a deterioration in the physical and psychological condition of many inmates. Structured recreational activities will provide opportunities for releasing physical and emotional tensions and for developing sporting and cultural interests. Both inmates and those responsible for running the institution will benefit.

Activities which could be fostered include weight-lifting, wrestling, yard games (tennis, volleyball, etc.), physical fitness classes, debating, drama, ethnic and aboriginal cultural activities, and art and music groups. The range of activities which could be timetabled can be greatly expanded when additional recreational facilities (such as an oval, running track and gymnasium) are constructed and when additional space is available within the Divisions for non-accommodation purposes.
In 1982, there were a total of 327 individual shop (including laundry) closures due to staff absences, i.e. an average of 27.25 shop closures per month. Closures ranged from 6 shops in August to 53 in January when at least one shop was closed every day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>No. of Shop Closures</th>
<th>Closures Due to Correctional Industry Officer Absences (%)</th>
<th>Closures Due to Shortage of General Duty Officers (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.82 to 31.12.82</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>1.6.82 to 31.12.82</td>
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<td>1.9.82 to 31.12.82</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1.83 to 18.2.83</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Assistant Manager, Programmes will be responsible for progressively incorporating recreational programmes into the normal routine of the institution. The co-operation and active participation of other staff should be sought in the planning and conduct of these activities. Members of staff and people from the outside community with particular interests and qualifications should provide the necessary leadership for these activities.

RECOMMENDATION 7.5  REVITALISE THE INDUSTRIES PROGRAMME BY REDUCING WORKSHOP CLOSURES AND COMMISSIONING THE NEW INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Yatala Labour Prison is currently not able to consistently provide meaningful work for every inmate. The difficulties inherent in operating any prison industry programme are compounded at Yatala by:

- frequent shop closures (averaging 9 days out of 20 in some shops) due to the absence of Correctional Industry and General Duty Officers (see Exhibit 7)
- the short time allowed for the working day
- the competition for this time from other activities
- the counter-attraction of (sometimes) less demanding 7 day a week jobs
- little incentive for improved work performance or for gaining additional skills
- lack of continuity in General Duty Officers rostered to workshops
- no work being provided for "S" & "D" Division inmates
- lack of Head Office and Industrial Complex staff (e.g. proposed Project Officer, Marketing Officer and Clerk).

The efficiency and effectiveness of the industries programme needs to be improved markedly to meet the institution's basic obligations to inmates and to the community which has a sizeable capital and staff investment in the industrial programme. This improvement can only occur through concerted and co-operative action by custodial and industry staff within Yatala and by both Head Office and Yatala management. All those involved have a vested interest in reducing the number of shop closures and commissioning the new Industrial Complex.
Workshop closures due to absences of Correctional Industry Officers can be reduced by:

- whenever possible, matching special training, personal appointments, and similar absences with rostered workshop closures or periods when the workshops are to be used for short courses with outside expertise

- appointing up to 3 additional relieving CIO's to cover absences and reduce the number of call-backs.

Workshop closures due to insufficient General Duty Officers will be minimised by the creation of a unit team which can be flexibly deployed to cover industrial work areas, by reducing the shortfall in correctional staff numbers and by reinforcing the institution's priority commitment to the industrial programme by closing other areas of the Prison in preference to workshops.

Prompt action to commission the new Industrial Complex is vitally important for the credibility of the Department and the effectual operation of Yatala Labour Prison. The consultancy team is aware that considerable effort has already been spent on formulating proposals for securing, staffing and operating the Complex. However, the lack of positive decisions on these matters is a contributory factor to the malaise currently pervading Yatala Labour Prison.
SECTION 8. INMATE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
SECTION 8. INMATE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

INTRODUCTION

Creative inmate management practices can provide a positive environment for officers and inmates and reduce the detrimental effects of prison life. As emphasised in preceding sections, good management practices facilitate the control of prisoners by relieving some of the pressures which culminate in incidents among inmates or between inmates and staff. It is no longer acceptable to treat prisoners as non-entities who must conform to a standard prison regimen. The individuality of inmates should be catered for as far as possible in the functioning of the institution. However, it is essential that staff and inmates are given clear, reasonable and consistent directives covering all aspects of the Prison's operations.

There are major inadequacies with existing inmate management practices at Yatala Labour Prison. In particular:

- inmates spend less than 8½ hours per day (8.00 am to 4.30 pm) out of their cells, resulting in considerable inmate frustration and impairment of the Prison's ability to achieve the Department's aim of minimising recidivism and increasing the social competence of offenders

- confused and inconsistent management practices exist throughout the institution and the wider correctional system, with a consequent detrimental impact on attempts to modify inmate behaviour through a system of incentives

- visiting arrangements and facilities are not conducive to maintaining individual dignity, family relationships and the privacy appropriate to personal and special visits.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 8.1 INTRODUCE ROSTERED EVENINGS OUT OF CELLS, INITIALLY TWICE A WEEK, AND A RANGE OF SUITABLE STRUCTURED AND UNSTRUCTURED ACTIVITIES.

Yatala Labour Prison should set itself the goal, with the backing of the Department and Government, of extending inmates' time out of cells by at least 3 hours on each day of the week within five years. The unacceptable and damaging 15 to 16 hours currently spent in cells has been highlighted by this and previous investigations.
The consulting team believes that major improvements can be achieved with minimum disruption and cost by immediately rostering "A" and "B" Division inmates two evenings a week when they can remain out of cells until 8.00 or 10.00 pm. We further recommend that additional evenings out of cells be rostered as soon as practicable - a target of an additional evening per week in each successive year would achieve 7 evenings per week within 5 years of implementing this recommendation.

As a first step, the various wings in "A" and "B" Divisions should be allocated two weekday evenings for out of cell activities within designated activity areas. These areas would cater for structured and unstructured recreational and leisure pursuits in a yard or lounge/common room. At normal lock-up time, inmates from the rostered wing would indicate their choice of staying in their cells or moving to a designated venue. Except where an area can be isolated to allow free movement between the cells and lounge, movements must be controlled at the beginning and end of the evening activity period. Approximately 95 inmates would need to be moved on each evening - some in small groups going to activities off their floor, while others would go to activities on the same floor.

Evening periods can be used for a variety of constructive and relaxing purposes, including:

- unstructured lounge or common room activities such as TV, records, cards, pool and table tennis
- sporting and physical education activities (some organised)
- special cultural and entertainment events (e.g. plays, concerts, films)
- leisure, hobby and craft activities (e.g. music lessons, pottery, leatherwork, painting, printing, weaving)
- general educational courses for inmates who prefer or are required to remain at work during the day
- special counselling and treatment programmes.
Facilities are expected to progressively become available to conduct evening activities, particularly with the transfer of the workshops, education centre and library to the new Complex. The old store, showers and several other areas could also be used. New all-weather recreational facilities should be included in plans for re-developing the existing "C" Division and work compound areas.

Existing custodial, industries and programme staff should be used as widely as possible in planning and conducting evening activities. Opportunities should also be taken to employ outside expertise (e.g. a recreation officer) on a part-time basis pending the appointment of several full-time people to manage the expanded range of day and evening activities.

RECOMMENDATION 8.2  CREATE AN ADDITIONAL SHIFT TO PROVIDE STAFFING FOR EVENING ACTIVITIES AND TO IMPROVE STAFFING AT PEAK MOVEMENT PERIODS.

Creation of an afternoon shift (e.g. 12.00 noon to 8.30 pm or alternatively 2.00 pm to 10.30 pm with a 30 minute meal break), initially comprising 12 - 15 officers, would have the following operational advantages:

- 5 additional day shift officers (double the current number) could commence duty at 7.00 am to assist in the supervision of early morning movements

- some outside movements of prisoners and weekday visits could be deferred to the afternoon when additional officers would be available as escorts and utilities

- extra staff would be available for the heavy movement of inmates between 4.00 and 5.00 pm
between 5.30 pm and 8.30 pm or 10.30 pm the shift would, in conjunction with the first watch, cover existing movements (e.g. cooks, boiler room, medical orderlies) and supervise the new evening activities.

- special arrangements for prisoners to remain out of cells in hot weather could be supervised by the afternoon shift, thereby eliminating the need for other officers to work overtime.

The cost of improved staffing between 7.00 am and 8.30 am and 4.00 pm to 8.30 pm or 10.30 pm can be partially offset by reducing each of the first and second watches from 15 to 12 officers (i.e. ACCO I Surveillance Room, ACCO I Compound, SPO, Front Gate, "A" Division, "B" Division, "C" Division (2), "S" & "D" Divisions, Northwest Tower, Northfield Security Hospital Gate Tower, Patrol Officer). Patrols would actually consist of the ACCO I, SPO and Patrol General Duty Officer. This complement of officers, backed by the surveillance equipment and improved perimeter security measures recommended in Section 5, provide more than adequate security for the no movement period from 8.00 pm to 7.00 am.

RECOMMENDATION 8.3 DEVELOP AN INCENTIVE OR PRIVILEGE SYSTEM FOR INMATES TIED TO PREFERRED ACCOMMODATION, ADDITIONAL EARNINGS, DISCRETIONARY TIME AND POSSESSIONS.

Existing rewards and punishments operate haphazardly and sometimes illogically through the classification system, pay and bonus rates and the decisions of individual Chiefs and General Duty Officers.

A carefully reasoned, well documented and widely promulgated system of incentives and privileges would give a sense of purpose and direction to the institution's activities and greatly improve order in the Prison. Inmates should be fully informed of the criteria used to determine incentives and privileges and how a reduction in classification can be earned. They will also need to appreciate what such a reduction means in terms of their prison lifestyle.
Yatala's management team should initiate a thorough investigation into proposals for a new points rating system for classification purposes and how this could be incorporated into a system for rewarding:

- skills used or responsibility taken in work situations
- notable achievements in industrial and other programmes
- individual initiative
- adherence to institutional requirements and positive attempts to make good use of time spent in prison.

Examples of incentives and privileges that could be granted, and withdrawn where appropriate, include differential rates of pay and bonuses, preferred accommodation, decoration of cells, discretionary time off to participate in appropriate activities, extra family visits, facility to sell personally produced items, better or personal clothing, etc.

RECOMMENDATION 8.4 IMPROVE INMATES' ACCESS TO FAMILY, FRIENDS AND SPECIAL VISITORS.

Improvements in accommodation and times available for contact visits is required, both to make these important occasions less traumatic for participants and to provide some semblance of oversight of the proceedings. New accommodation which provides more audio privacy and can be entered by visitors without entering the compound is highly desirable. Additional and longer visiting times could be scheduled on an inmate's discretionary half-day off. As a special privilege, family groups could meet in newly landscaped areas.

In keeping with the recognised trend for less restrictions on inmates' relationships outside of the Prison (e.g. censoring mail, contact visits), red phones should be installed within the Prison for inmates' use. The potential for aiding supportive relationships with the outside community would be significantly enhanced and far outweigh the few minor abuses that would occur.
APPENDICES:

A  ANALYSIS OF SICK LEAVE
B  ANALYSIS OF OVERTIME
C  QUALIFICATIONS OF CONSULTANT
APPENDIX A

ANALYSIS OF SICK LEAVE: 1.7.81 TO 30.6.82

YATALA LABOUR PRISON AND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL NO. OF OFFICERS</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENIOR AND CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS</td>
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<td>CHIEF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS</td>
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<td>CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRY OFFICERS</td>
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<td>PSYCHOLOGISTS</td>
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### APPENDIX B

**ANALYSIS OF CALL-BACKS, CALL-INS AND OVERTIME: 1.7.82 TO 17.2.83**

**YATALA LABOUR PRISON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NO. OF CALL-BACKS</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td>468</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>176</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SENIOR CORRECTIONAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>AND CORRECTIONAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>OFFICERS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3181</strong></td>
<td><strong>572</strong></td>
<td><strong>2017</strong></td>
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**AT A COST OF:**

- **CALL-BACKS**: $383,012
- **CALL-INS & OVERTIME**: $49,892
- **TOTAL COST**: $432,904
- **ANNUALISED**: $690,000

**NOTE:**

**CALL-BACKS**: Occur when an officer is called back to do an 8 hour shift on his or her rostered day off.

**CALL-INS**: Occur when an officer has completed an 8 hour shift and is subsequently recalled on the same day to perform extra hours of duty (these figures include call-ins for medical orderlies and dog squad officers).

**OVERTIME**: Occurs when an officer continues to work beyond the 8 hour shift (may include working through the lunch break).
Mr Hugh Swink is a Partner in the Management Consulting Division of Touche Ross & Co in Kansas City, Missouri, USA. He is the National Director of Correctional Services for Touche Ross & Co and is recognised internationally as an expert in the management of correctional departments and prisons. Mr Swink has 13 years of consulting experience and has managed the following major correctional reviews:

- Kansas - Master Plan for Corrections
- Colorado - Master Plan for Corrections
- Alaska - Master Plan for Corrections
- Iowa - Operations Review of Corrections
- Nebraska - Operations Review of Corrections
- South Australia - Operations Review of Corrections
- Oregon - Prison Industries Plan
- Lancaster County, Nebraska - Review of Gaol Operations

The above reviews included analysis and recommendations in the areas of security, staffing patterns, organisation and management style, facilities, inmate programmes, health care and food service, prison industries, training and capital planning.

In addition, Mr Swink spent three weeks in December of 1981 as a member of a US criminal justice delegation reviewing prisons in China.

Mr Swink is also a visiting instructor at the National Institute of Corrections in Boulder Colorado and served on the planning committee for the Corrections Division of the US Department of Justice in 1982.

Mr Swink has reviewed over 40 prisons and gaols in the course of his work. He has conferred with a number of his contemporaries in the US Federal system and toured their institutions. He has testified before four state legislations as an expert in security and prison management.